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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE 0. BISHOP, JR., 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 





GENICE GAY BISHOP, 
Third-party Defendant 
Appellant. 
Case No. 17082 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF, RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action filed by plaintiff, George 0. Bishop, 
Jr., against defendant, Charles Hollis Nielsen, for property 
damage incurred to plaintiff's vehicle in an automobile accident. 
Defendant filed a third-party complaint against the driver of 
plaintiff's vehicle, Genice Gay Bishop, for damage incurred by 
defendant's vehicle and for contribution upon plaintiff's cause 
of action against defendant. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Respondent agrees with the disposition recital of 
facts as set forth in Appellants' Brief. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant, and Third-Party Plaintiff, Respondent, 
Charles Hollis Nielsen, seeks to have a judgment rendered for 
30% contribution against Genice Gay Bishop affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondent agrees with the Statement of Facts as 
set forth by the Appellant with the additional information which 
the court should have. 
The Third-party Plaintiff, Respondent, Charles Hollis 
Nielsen, does not deny that the Third-party Defendant was born on 
June 30, 1960, and that she was 17 years of age at the time of the 
accident, and she lived with her parents. It was also stipulated 
in court that Genice Gay Bishop was not the owner of the car 
and was not the agent of her father at the time of the accident. 
The actual truth of the matter is that neither Charles 
Hollis Nielsen, Genice Gay Bishop or George 0. Bishop, Jr. really 
have any interest in the matter. Northwestern National Insurance 
Co. of Salt Lake City is the insurance carrier for George O. Bishop 
Jr. and Genice Gay Bishop, and Bear River Mutual Insurance Co. is 
the insurance carrier for Charles Hollis Nielsen. This matter is 
being brought pursuant to the insurance policies which provide 
-2-
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for subrogation. And under the subrogation receipt and insuring 
agreements the actions and complaints are brought nominally in the 
names of the plaintiff and the defendant. So the suit here does 
not bog itself down on an inter-family immunity problem, but it 
is an inter-family insurance company or carrier problem. That is 
\ 
liability as to who is going to pay for the damages arising out of 
the accident or the contribution and comparative negligence of each 
of the parties as hereinafter stated is the question and it is 
sheer hypocrisy to indicate any inter-£.amily immunity or inter-
family conflict is involved here because all we have are the 
various parties testifying in relationship to inter-family insur-
ance companies and the law of liability and contribution in respect 
to each of them. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANT, CHARLES HOLLIS NIELSEN, CAN RECOVER 
JUDGMENT FOR CONTRIBUTION FROM THE THIRD-PARTY 
DEFENDANT, GENICE GAY BISHOP, UNDER THE UTAH 
CONTRIBUTION STATUTE, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
§78-27-39, (Repl. 1977). 
Under Utah law the right to contribution only exists 
against one who is "jointly or severally liable in tort for the 
same injury." U.C.A. §78-27-40(3), 1953, as amended. 
The Utah contribution amont joint tort feasors act 
provides: "The right of contribution shall exist among joint 
tort feasors ... " U.C.A. §78-27-39 (Repl. 1977) A joint tort 
feasor is defined as: 
-3-
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One of two or more persons, jointly or severally 
liable in tort for the same injury to person or 
property, whether or not judgment has been 
recovered against all or some of them. 
U. C. A. § 7 8- 2 4- 7 0 ( 3) (Rep 1. 19 7 7) 
Therefore, under the statute, even though a person may 
be negligent in reference to a particular accident or a particular 
injury, he cannot be liable for contribution for that accident 
and for damages unless he has an enforceable action against him 
for the injury itself. 
The jury in the above-entitled case found that Genice 
Gay Bishop was 30% negligent and Charles Hollis Nielsen was 70% 
negligent in causing the damages to the automobile of George 0. 
Bishop Jr. This Third-party Plaintiff, Respondent states that 
the trial court was correct in assessing negligence on a compara-
tive basis because they were both joint tort feasors and both 
were responsible for the damages to the automobile owned by 
Genice Gay Bishop's father, George 0. Bishop, Jr. 
The real question is, as we will hereafter explain, 
whether George 0. Bishop Jr. can recover and require the insurance 
carrier of Genice Gay Bishop to repair his car 100% when his 
daughter was 30% negligent in the cause of the accident. The 
question is whether George 0. Bishop's insurance carrier, fronting 
through George 0. Bishop Jr. can require Bear River Mutual Insur-
ance Co. to pay 100% of its claim on the repair of George 0. 
Bishop Jr. 's car so that his daughter can go out and drive it 
through another light or stop sign. George 0. Bishop, Jr. and 
-4-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Genice Gay Bishop, his daughter, say that we cannot recover contri-
bution from his daughter because of "the inter-family iIImlunity 
doctrine". 
There are many ALR citations on this commencing in 
1951, as set forth in 19 ALR 2d 425, at page 3; 60 ALR 2d page 1286, 
in 1958; and 41 ALR 3d in 1972. If the above entitled court will 
note and take observance, the said Bishops in this case used the 
authorities in 19 ALR 2d and 60 ALR 2d, but failed to use the 
41 ALR 3d in 1972. What was true in 1951 and 1958 at the time 
those annotations were written has been drastically changed and 
the law has undergone a complete revision in the 25 years. 
The background and the SU11llllary of the inter-family 
inrrnunity doctrine is discussed extensively by the annotator in 
41 ALR 3d at page 909 as follows: 
"The law with respect to the liability of parents 
for the negligent injuries of their children has 
been, and continues to be, in a highly unsatisfactory 
state, as evidenced by the great variety of identi-
fiably distinguishable holdings, the differences in 
emphasis in decisions ostensibly following similar 
rules, the shifting of positions either in specific 
terms or by changes in interpretation of governing 
cases, the proliferation of exceptions and limitations 
to varyingly defined general rules, and the apparently 
completely irreconcilable basic premises invoked as 
the fundamental rationale. 
A reading of the cases suggests that a cause for the 
present and apparently growing confusion on this 
subject is, at least to some degree, a basic conflict 
in the social outlook of various courts, with some 
feeling that parental tort irrrrnunity was necessary to 
the very existence of an ordered society, in which the 
family might be considered a form of government, 
-5-
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and others feeling a need to bring a measure of 
orderliness and syrmnetry to the applicable legal 
concepts, all of .which basic conflicting outlooks 
were exacerbated by continuing criticism by legal 
theoreticians, by changing concepts with respect to 
the family, and by changing economic realities, 
particularly the advent of the automobile and the 
prevelence of liability insurance. 
The origins of the parental inrrnunity doctrine pro-
vide an initial source of weakness. · It appears that 
prior to the year 1891, only three cases dealing with 
the tort liability of parents and persons in loco 
parentis had appeared, in all of which more or less 
support was given to the idea of liability, at least 
as applied to cases of gross neglect, unreasonable 
punishment, and acts injurious to the life or health 
of the child or constituting a public offense. It 
appears that the modern doctrine of parental irmnunity 
for negligently caused injuries grew out of holdings 
in three early cases which involved wilful tort, 
without precedent in cormnon law. The courts employed 
language in favor of immunity which was seized upon 
and followed by many cases thereafter notwithstanding 
the fact that the courts cited no authority for their 
proposition. The courts said, in effect, that the peace 
of society and of families, as well as a sound public 
policy designed to subserve the repose of families 
and the best interestsof society, barred the minor 
child from asserting a claim to civil redress for 
personal injuries suffered at the hands of the 
parent. It appears that from these cases developed 
the thesis, accepted in a majority of the states, 
holding a parent immune from suit by a child for 
injuries negligently inflicted. Thereafter, the courts 
with surprising unanimity, followed the immunity doc-
trine, initially finding little difficulty in applying 
the doctrine to negligence cases in view of their 
position where wilful tort was involved. 
The first strong, well-reasoned, and extensively quoted 
attack on the immunity doctrine in a case involving 
parental negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle 
came in 1923 in the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice 
Clark in Small v. Morrison (1923) 185 NC 577, 118 SE 
12 , 31 AL R 113 5 . ·k -.,'\ ·k 
-6-
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While the existence of liability insurance would appear 
to be a major element causing the general erosion of 
the parental tort immunity doctrine, the courts which 
have recognized various exceptions to the rule have 
generally stated that insurance coverage could not 
create liability where noneexisted otherwise, but 
that such coverage was a factor to be considered 
in the weight to be given the reasons advanced in favor 
of the doctrine, while other courts appear to have 
refused to give the matter of insurance coverage any 
consideration. 
number of courts have abandoned the 
courts reco nizin t e nee or arent immunit 
under certain circumstances to be etermined on a 
case-by-case basis, and with still other courts enun-
ciating a general limitation to the nonimmunity rule 
whereby suits would be barred where the case involved 
parental authority over the child or exercise of 
ordinary parental discretion with respect to the care 
of the child. While in general the abrogation of the 
immunity doctrine has been grounded on the considera-
tion of general legal principles, there is at least 
some authority to the effect that unemancipated minor 
children have a right to sue their parents for negli-
gently inflicted injuries by virtue of constitutional 
and statutory provisions declaring that everyone is 
responsible to another for injuries caused by want of 
ordinary care of skill. * * * 
In sunnnary, it is clear that with an apparent trend 
in the direction of permitting tort actions by minor 
children against their parents, the courts are aban-
doning the position of an early case that such suits 
would be unseemly and not in keeping with the eternal 
fitness of things. 
-7-
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The following states in dealing with the liability of 
a parent for negligent injury to an unemancipated child, have 
specifically abrogat~d the parental tort immunity doctrine, or in 
recognition of such abrogation, have taken the position that as a 
general rule, a parent may be liabile to his child for injuries 
caused by the parent's negligence, at least in the absence of 
special circumstances excepting the parent from such liability 
or lim~ting the scope thereof. 
Alaska--Hebel v. Hebel, (1967, Alaska) 435 P2d 8. 
Arizona--Streenz v. Streenz, (1970) 106 Ariz 86, 
471 P2d 282, 41 ALR 3d 891. 
Cal--Gibson v. Gibson, (1970) 3 Cal 3d 914, 
92 Cal Rptr 288, 479 P2d 648. 
Hawaii--Peterson v. Honolulu, (1969) 51 Hawaii 484, 
462 P2d 1007. 
Minn--Silesk~ v. Kelman, (1968) 281 Hinn 431, 
161 NW2d 6 1. 
NH--Briere v. Briere, (1966) 107 NH 432, 224 A2d 588. 
NJ--France v. A.P.A. Transport Corp., (1970) 56 NJ 500, 
267 A2d 490. 
NY--Gelbman v. Gelbman, (1969) 23 NY2d 434, 297 NYS 
2d 529, 245 NE2d 192. 
ND--Nuelle v. Wells, (1967, ND) 154 NW2d 364. 
Vt--Xaphes v. Mossey, (1963, DC Vt) 224 F Supp 578, 
infra, applying Vermont law. 
Wis--Goller v. White, (1963) 20 Wis 2d 402, 122 NW2d 
193. 
-8-
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In 59 Am. Jur. 2d, "Parent and Child", § 151, Tort Actions, 
page 252, the volume was written in 1971 and the cumulative supplement 
of 1978 in addition to the ALR citations show at least ten more 
states have abolished the "PARENTAL IMMUNITY RULE", they are as 
follows: 
Ky-Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 SW2d 921. 
Mich--Plumley v. Klein, 199 NW2d 169. 
Va--Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 183 SE2d 190. 
Pa--Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A2d 351. 
W. Va--Lee v. Comer, 224 SE2d 721 
D.C.--Perchell v. District of Columbia, 444 F2 997 
Ill--Schenk v. Schenk, 241 NE2d 1 
Nev--(1974), David Rupert v. Andre Jean Steinne, 528 P.2d 
1013. 
Vt.--Wood v. Wood, (1977) 370 A2d 191 
NC--After its court upheld it, abolished it by statute. 
To show the general rationale of the cases which certainly 
appear to be more convincing than any of the non basic rationale 
of the previous cases, is the case of Sharen Streenz v. James T. 
Streenz, 471 P.2d 282 (Ariz. 1970), Sharon Streenz, a minor, brought 
an action against per parents for damages arising out of an auto-
mobile accident. 
The Supreme Court of, Arizona said: 
"Although most state courts have adopted the parental 
immunity doctrine, there have been notable exceptions 
. . . We find that the rationale of these cases and 
legal authorities, arguing in favor of partial abro-
gation of the parental immunity doctrine, are more 
consistent with contemporary conditions and concepts 
of fairness. 
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"Even in jurisdictions where parental immunity has been 
openly embraced, courts have evinced hostility for the 
doctrine by creating numerous exceptions to its appli-
cations. Thus, in most states, an unemancipated child 
may sue his parents under contract or property theory." 




"(l) We feel that two principal factors undermine 
Judge Malloy's 'domestic tranquility' rationale 
expressed in Purcell v. Frazer, supra, and compel an 
overruling of that case. One factor, as expressed 
above, is that the common law has long permitted child 
to sue parent in property or contract. It is not 
unsafe to say that some of the most bitter family dis-
putes arise over property, and yet parental immunity 
does not limit causes of action in this area. Is it 
reasonable to say that our law should protect the pro-
perty and contract rights of a minor more zealously than 
the rights of his person? 
Secondly, we cannot ignore the almost universal 
existence of liability insurance, particularly in the 
automobile accident realm. Where such insurance 
exists, the domestic tranquility argument is hollow, 
~for in realit the sou ht after liti ation is not 
' etween c i an parent s insurance carrier. 
The court then went on to say: 
"(2) While we are persuaded that parental immunity 
from tort action by an unemancipated child should be 
retained for limited purposes such as those set down 
by the Wisconsin court. 
(1) Where the alleged negligent act involves 
an exercise of parental authority over the 
child; and 
(2) where the alleged negligent act involves 
an exercise of ordinary parental discretion 
with respect to the provision of food, clothing, 
housing, medical and dental services, and other 
care, 122 N.W.2d at 193. 
we find it unnecessary at this time to delineate the 
scope in which the parental immunity rule will be 
applied. Our holding, permitting Sharon Streenz 
to sue her parents in tort, is limited to the factual 
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situation before us. We specifically hold that an 
une~ancipated minor child has a right of action 
against her parents for injuries incurred in an 
accident allegedly caused by her mother's negligent 
driving." 
In the case of Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y. 2d 434, 297 
N.Y.S. 2d 529, 245 N.E.2d 192, 194 (1969) the Supreme Court of 
New York again abrogating the inter-family irnmunitv doctrine in 
reference to automobile accidents said: 
"The argument fails to explain how the possibility of 
fraud would be magically removed merely by the 
child's attainment of legal majority. Nor does the 
argument pretend to present the first instance in 
which there is the possiblity of a collusive and 
fraudulent suit. There are analogous situations in 
which we rely upon the ability of the jury to distin-
guish between valid and fraudulent claims. The 
effectiveness of the jury system will pertain in the 
present situation. The definite and vital interest 
of society in protecting people from losses resulting 
from accidents should remain paramount." 
In Goller vs. White, 122 NW 2d, 198 (1963), the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin placed the first wedge in the whole doctrine 
of the inter-family immunity and abrogated a whole line of previous 
Wisconsins decisions stating that parental immunity ought to be 
abrogated except in two situations: 
"Nevertheless, we consider the wide prevalence 
of liability insurance in personal injury actions 
a proper element to be considered in making the 
policy decision of whether to abrogate parental 
immunity in negligence actions. This is because 
in a great majority of such actions, where such 
iIIllilunity has been abolished, the existence of 
insurance tends to negate any possible disruption 
of family harmony and discipline. 
-11-
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"(2,3) After a careful review of the arguments 
for and against the parental-immunity rule in 
negligence cases, we are of the opinion that it 
ought to be abrogated except in these two situa-
tions: (1) where the alleged negligent act in-
volves an exercise of parental authority over the 
child; and (2) where the alleged negligent act in-
volves an exercise of ordinary parental discretion 
with respect to the provision of food, clothing, 
housing, medical and dental services, and other care." 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in the case of Lemmen v. 
Servais, 39 Wis 2d 75, 158 NW2d 341 (1968) states: 
"The iilllilunity granted by these two exceptions is 
accorded the parent, not because he is a parent, 
but because as a parent he pursues a course within 
the family constellation which society exacts of him 
and which is beneficial to the state. The parental 
non-liability is not granted as a reward, but as a 
means of enabling the parents to discharge the 
duties wJ:iich society exacts." 
In the very interesting case of Petty Walker v. Tully 
B. Milton, 268 So. Rptr. 2d, 654, (1974 La), it held: 
"Statute prohibiting suit by unemancipated minor 
against either parent during their marriage did not 
destroy substantive causes of action arising between 
parent and child but rather operated only as pro-
cedural bar to an action, and thus contribution was 
allowable in favor of joint tort-feasor against 
parent whose negligence contributed to her child's 
injuries;" 
Counsel for Mr. Bishop sets forth on page 6 of his 
Brief the case of Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 384 P2d 389 (Utah 
1963). That case turned on two basis: (1) the guest statute, 
and (2) interspousal immunity. The fact that Utah has adopted 
interspousal innnunity as herein set forth does not apply to 
the inter-family irrnnunity family relationships. As Prosser in his 
work, "Law of Torts", 4th Edition, ~122, (1971), states: 
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"Any tort action between husband and wife encountered 
at the outset the common law doctrine of the legal 
identity of the two. It has been said, whether 
humorously or not, that at collllilon law husband and 
wife were one person, and that person was the husband 
--which is not strictly accurate, since the criminal 
law, at least, regarded them as separate individuals, 
and the wife could be named as a party to a civil 
action, even though her husband must be joined with 
her, if he were alive when suit was brought. But 
as to her personal and property rights, the very 
legal existence of the wife was regarded as suspended 
for the duration of the marriage, and merged into 
that of the husband, so that she ~ost the capacity 
to contract for herself, or to sue or be sued without joining the husband." 
But Prosser says in §122, commencing at page 864: 
The com_mon law had no similar conception of unity of 
legal identity in the case of a parent and his minor 
child. Although the parent was given custody of the 
child, the latter remained a separate legal person, 
entitled to the benefits of his own property and 
to the enforcement of his own choses in action, in-
cluding those in tort, and was liable in turn as an 
individual for his own torts. Consequently there were 
no such theoretical difficulties, no emancipation 
acts similar to the Married Women's Acts were necessary 
and statutory construction has not entered into the 
question of tort liability between parent and child. 
In matters affecting property, causes of action 
seems always to have been freely recognized, on the 
part of either the parent or the child. Although 
there were no old decisions, the speculation on the 
matter has been that there is no good reason to think 
that.the English law would not permit actions for 
personal torts as well, subject always to the parent's 
privilege to enforce reasonable discipline against the 
child; and there are decisions in Canada and Scotland 
holding that such an action will lie. But beginning 
in 1891 with Hewlett v. George a Mississippi case of 
false imprisonment which cited no authorities, the 
American courts adopted a general rule refusing to 
allow actions between parent and minor child for 
personal torts, whether they are intentional or 
negligent in character. For reasons that are not 
altogether clear, however, and perhaps are to be 
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explained only on the basis of an initial retreat 
from the general rule, the action nearly always has 
been permitted against one who is not a parent but 
merely stands in the place of one, such as a step-
father or another relative who has custody of the 
child. 
The courts which deny the action have relied heavily 
on the analogy of husband and wife, which seems 
uite ina licable because of the difference in the 
common aw concept o t ere ations, and t e a sence 
of statutes to be construed. 
Prosser then continues on under ~122 at page 867: 
As in the case of husband and wife, some courts have 
allowed recovery when the relation has been terminated 
by the death of either parent or child, and the action 
is brought under a wrongful death or a survival act. 
Even this has been extended to permit an action between 
parent or loss of services of another child, on the 
ground that these are derivati~e actions, turning 
primarily upon the possibility of suit by another. 
Finally, there are half a dozen courts which have 
allowed recovery where the child is injured in the 
course of a business, rather than a personal activity 
of the parent, making an artificial separation of 
vocational from personal capacity, which suggests a 
dislike of the immunity more than anything else. 
Finally, in 1963, Wisconsin took the lead in declaring 
that the parent-child immunity was abrogated entirely 
in that jurisdiction, except as to exercises of parental 
control and authority, or parental discretion with 
respect to such matters as food and care. The decision 
set off something of a long overdue landslide; and at 
the present writing it has been followed in Alaska, 
Arizona, California, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
York, and North Dakota. The prediction is easy 
to make that the number of such jurisdictions will 
henceforth be rapidly on the increase. 
The effect which liability insurance has thus far 
had upon the family immunities is not very easy to 
evaluate. Where there is such insurance, it becomes 
still more difficult to maintain most of the stock 
arguments against allowing recovery. Since the 
defendant will not have to pay out of his own pocket, 
it is obvious that the family exchquer will not be 
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d~minished, and that domestic harmony will not be 
?isrupted.so much by allowing the action as by denying 
it; and since the party really interested in the 
defense is the liability insurer, any conception of 
family unity and sanctity can scarcely extend to or 
protect him. And where insurance is readily available, 
there is no great need to be tender of defendants who 
do not have it, since decisions imposing liability 
may be expected to lead to its purchase ... " 
The rationale of almost all of the cases is basically set forth 
by the Supreme Court of California, in the matter of James Gibson 
vs. Robert Gibson, 479 P2d 648: 
"No sooner had American courts including our own, 
embraced the parental irrnnunity doctrine than they 
began to fashion a number of qualifications and 
exceptions to it ... 
The danger to family harmony was the only rationale 
for immunity mentioned in Trudell. In Self, however, 
we termed this argument 'illogical and unsound.' 
Observing that spouses commonly sue each other over 
property matters, we concluded that 'It would not 
appear that such assumed conjugal harmony is any 
more endangered by tort actions than by property actions 
·k 7~ ·k • ' ( 5 8 Ca 1 . 2 d 6 8 3 , 6 9 0 , 2 6 Ca 1 . Rp tr . . 9 7 , 101 , 
376 P.2d 65, 67.) Indeed, as we shall discuss, infra, 
the risk of family discord is much less in negligence 
actions, where an adverse judgment will normally be 
satisfied by the defendant family member's insurance 
carrier, than in property actions, where it will 
generally be paid out of the defendant's pocket. 
Since the- law has long allowed a child to sue his 
parent over property matters (King v. Sells (1938) 
193 Wash. 294, 75 P.2d 130; Lamb v. Lamb (1895) 146 
N.Y. 317, 41 N.E. 26), the rationale of self is 
equally applicable to parent-child tort suits . 
. . . In deciding to abrogate parental immunity, we 
are also persuaded by several policy factors. One is 
the obvious but important legal principle that "when 
there is negligence, the rule is liability, immunity 
is the exception . . . 
-15-
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Secondly, we feel that we cannot overlook the wide-
spread prevalence of liability insurance and its 
practical effect on intra-family suits. Although it 
is obvious that insurance does not create liability 
where none otherwise exists (Emery v. Emery, supra 
45 Cal.2d 421, 431, 289 P.2d 218), it is unrealistic 
to ignore this factor in making an informed policy 
decision on whether to abolish parental negligence 
immunity. (See Goller v. White, supra, 20 Wis, 2d 
402, ·412, 122 N.W. 2d 193.) We can no longer con-
sider child-parent actions on the outmoded assumption 
that parents may be required to pay damages to their 
children . . . 
By our decision today we join 10 other states which 
have already abolished parental tort immunity. We 
think it is significant that since 1963, when the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court drove the first wedge (Goller 
v. White, Supra, 20 Wis.2d 402, 122 NW2d 193), other 
jurisdictions have steadily hacked away at this legal 
deadwood." 
Then finally, as the Utah Supreme Court, 1976, upholding 
the contribution statute has set forth in Bushnell v. Sillitoe, 550 
P.2d 1284: 
78-27-39 provides: "The right of contribution shall 
exist among joint tort-feasors, but a joint tort-feasor 
shall not be entitled to a money judgment for con-
tribution until he has, by payment, discharged the 
connnon liability or more than nis prorata share thereof. 
In Au~ustus v. Bean, 58 Cal.2d 270, 14 Cal. Rptr. 
641,63 P.2d 873 (1961), the court observed that 
the statutory system for contribution did not con-
cern the relationship of tort-feasors to the one 
injured, but dealt with the relationship of tort-
feasors to each other; when after entry of judgment 
one of them discharged the common liability. 
POINT II 
UTAH SHOULD FOLLOW THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONTRI-
BUTION STATUTE AS INTERPRETED BY THE HIGHEST COURTS 
OF THAT STATE BECAUSE UTAH BORROWED ITS COMPARATIVE 
NEGLIGENCE STATUTE FROM WISCONSIN. 
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In this case the Utah Legislature on March 8, 1973, 
passed the Comparative Negligence Statute borrowing it completely 
from Wisconsin wherein it had been interpreted since 1931. 
As stated in 73 Am. Jur. 2d, Statutes, §167, page 370: 
"Although the full faith and credit clause of the 
Federal Constitution does not so require, where the 
statute of a sister state is before the court, the 
construction placed upon the statute by the highest 
courts of that state should be followed. This is so 
even though the courts of the forum would place a 
different construction upon similar language in a 
statute within their own jurisdiction. Similarly, the 
construction of a statute of a foreign country should 
be governed by the decisionsof the courts of that coun-
try. If the court of the forum is not afforded such 
aid, it must give to the statute the best construction 
it is able to give, in the same manner that it 
should construe an act of its own legislature." 
Our Supreme Court in the case of Donahue v. Warner Bros. 
Pictures Distributing Corp., 272 P.2d 177, stated the general rule 
that when a statute is taken from another state, the construction 
on that statute or its interpretation will be followed. Our court 
stated as follows: 
"(1,2) It is well settled that 'when the legislature 
of a state has used a statute of another state or 
country as a guide for the preparation and enactment 
of a statute, the courts of the adopting state will 
usually adopt the construction placed on the statute 
in the jurisdiction of its inception.'" 
In reference to that particular case, our Supreme Court then went 
on to state the general law: 
" . our Legislature may be assumed to have been 
aware of the construction of the statute by the 
courts of the state of its origin at the time of our 
enactment . . . " 
-17-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Supreme Court in the case of Utah Power & Light v. 
Public Service Commission, 152 P.2d 542, at page 556 states: 
" . . . The only importance attached to the argument 
that the Utah Act was copied from the statutes of 
Idaho rather than from the statutes of California 
or vice versa is this: When statutes of another state 
are adopted, it is assumed that the prior construction 
placed upon such adopted statutes by the courts of 
the other state is also adopted ... " 
It is also submitted that the following states have now 





















It is now submitted, that almost uniformly, that every state that 
has adopted the Comparative Negligence statute has also adopted 
the contribution and abolished the parental immunity doctrine, ;.,->.:: 
never really was common law and was not adopted by any state until 
Mississippi in about 1910. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR IN GRANTING A JUDGMENT 
FOR CONTRIBUTION AGAINST THE THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT 
BECAUSE THE THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT IS A JOINT TORT 
FEASOR. 
The trial court did not error in granting the judgment for 
contribution against the third-party defendant because the third-
party defendant is a joint tort-feasor because the basic the basic 
argument of the third-party defendant is that she cannot be a joint 
tort-feasor because an action will not lie against her because of 
the inter-family immunity doctrine. If the inter-family immunity 
doctrine falls because they are both joint tort-feasors so does the 
argument of Point III because it is exactly the same argument as 
set forth in Point I and Point II, because they are both depen-
dent upon each other. This has been completely answered by our 
Supreme Court in Bushnell v. Sillitoe, Utah (1976) 550 P.2d 1984: 
§78-27-39 provides: "The right of contribution shall 
exist amont joint tort-feasors, but a joint tort-feasor 
shall not be entitled to a money judgment for con-
tribution until he has, by payment, discharged the 
common liability or more than his prorata share thereof. 
In Augustus v. Bean, 58 Cal. 2d 270, 14 Cal. Rptr. 
641, 363 P.2d 873, (1961), the court observed that 
the statutory system for contribution did not concern 
the relationship of tor-feasors to the one injured, 
but dealt with the relationship of tort-feasors to 
each other; when after entry of judgment one of them 
discharged the common liability." 
CONCLUSION 
There are now approximately 23 states which have abolished 
the parent-child immunity doctrine, which was an 1891 Mississippi 
protege on the basis that inter-family relations would be threatened 
and destroyed and the harmony of the home would be injured contrary 
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to the policy of law. This was on the theory that after a father 
has maimed, crippled and beaten his son or his daughter there is a 
state of peace and harmony left to be disturbed, and if the 
son or daughter is sufficiently injured or angry to sue the 
father for it, they will be soothed and deterred from reprisal 
by denying them a legal remedy even though the child may have left 
the home. Even though the same courts refuse to find any 
disruption of family tranquility, if the son or the daughter 
sues their father or their mother for a tort to their property, 
or brings a criminal prosecution against them, or the brother or 
sister sue each other. If this reasoning appeals to anyone, let 
him by all means adopt it. 
, Again, are we not faced with the proposition that in 
general minor children are entitled to the same redress for wrongs 
done to them as other people. As the Supreme Court said in 
Petersen v. City and County of Honolulu, 462 P.2d 1007, quoting 
from Barlow v. Iblings, Iowa, 156 N.W.2d 105 (1968), where is 
there justice when a six-year old child looses his hand in an 
electric meat cutter because of the negligence of his father and 
is prohibited from suing his father because the courts say that 
to allow the suit would disrupt the harmony and tranquility of 
the family relationship. "In our view, such results are unconsc:~""':-.~: 
It is the conclusion and the position of the third-party 
plaintiff that the third-party complaint should be allowed. The 
Legislature moved boldly in enacting Utah Code Annotated, §78-27-39 
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(1953), allowing contribution among joint tort-feasors where before 
there was no such remedy in Utah. Allowing this Complaint is con-
sistent with the intent behind this statute and does not violate the 
principles of inter-family immunity doctrine either now or as it 
existed at cormnon law or by the majority of the states that have 
rejected it. 
Dated this day of October, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted, 
T omas A. Du 
Attorney for De 
Ten Broadway Buildin , Suite 510 
Salt·Lake City, Utah 84101 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing to 
Philip R. Fishler, Attorney for Plaintiff and Third-party defendant, 
604 Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, postage prepaid, 
this day of October, 1980. 
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